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'Of the vainglorious Don Quixote's success in 
the dreadful and never before imagined 
Adventure of the Windmills, with other events 
worthy of happy record.'
The Chancellor's sudden 
announcement last year that a major 
restructuring is to take place in the 
regulatory structure for banking and 
financial services, raises an inevitable 
question   is the right target being 
attacked? What is on offer is that a super 
Securities and Investments Board (SIB)   
the Financial Services Authority   is to 
take over the regulatory responsibilities of 
the Bank of England, the self-regulating 
organisations, the recognised professional 
bodies and certain other issues such as 
ministerial responsibility for insurance. It 
will also take over responsibility for 
regulating Eloyd's of London.
The cause of this is the understandable 
belief that some of the regulatory bodies 
have failed to reach the standard that 
might be hoped for. The Bank of England 
failed to some extent over Barings andO
spectacularly over BCCI. IMRO were 
lucky to survive as a regulator at all after 
the Maxwell saga. FIMBRA and LAUTRO 
did not survive as such in any event. The 
real issue for the average investor though
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is; what are the real causes of losing 
money? Without in any way minimising 
the sufferings of Maxwell pensioners, or 
those who had deposits with BCCI, far 
greater numbers are suffering financial 
loss on a daily basis because the 
regulations permit it.
MORTGAGES
The largest financial commitment the 
average person in this country makes is 
their mortgage. Despite this, there 
remains an absence of legislationO
protecting consumers taking out such 
loans. Mortgages are not a category of 
'investment' as defined by the Financial 
Services Act 1986. Nor is it within the 
definition of 'consumer credit' within the 
Act of that name of 1974. Thus, on arrival 
at the bank or building society which 
offers the loan, the consumer is provided 
with no legal protection stopping the 
lender from recommending the mortgage 
which provides the lender with the 
greatest profit, rather than that which is 
most appropriate for their customer.
Many borrowers take out endowment 
mortgages. The term life policy element 
of these are covered by the financial 
services regime   because term life 
assurance of ten years or over is 
categorised as an 'investment' bv sch. 1 to
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the Financial Services Act. Likewise, the 
less common PEPS mortgages and 
pension mortgages will also have the 
investment element regulated, as both 
PEPS and most pensions are caught by the 
definition of 'collective investment 
schemes', within sch. 1 and s. 75. This 
raises the illusion that the financial 
services regime provides a real degree of 
protection. For some it will. One bank 
and a few building societies operate as 
independent financial advisers and are 
thus required to offer the best advice (or 
'standards of advice' to use the less 
illuminating current terminology) in 
relation to the investment element. 
However, only a small minority of 
investors will find themselves with this 
protection. The other banks and building 
societies are all tied to investment 
product providers which they either own 
or with whom they have contractual 
agreements. Their legal obligation does 
not involve choosing between different 
products   merely in selling what they 
have.
There is another element   the 
requirement of 'suitability'. This requires 
all investment product advisers to advise
in favour of, or sell, only those 
investments that are suited to their 
customers' needs. This entails filling in a 
questionnaire about the customer's 
circumstances and then making sure that 
an appropriate category of investment is 
offered. One could imagine steps being 
taken by a regulator if a product provider 
were habitually selling pension mortgages 
to those who would be better suited to 
endowment mortgages. But are there any 
steps being taken by regulators to try and 
control the extent to which investment 
related mortgages are sold to those who, 
in many cases, would be better advised to 
take out a repayment mortgage and invest 
any surplus income in a way that better 
suits their needs?
FEES v COMMISSION
Another common problem is that when 
faced with independent financial advisers, 
customers are often offered a choice 
between paying a fee or allowing the 
adviser to keep the commission. Faced 
with a choice between writing out aO
cheque and having the fee taken care of by 
what will seem to many to be 'funny 
money', it is not surprising that the 
majority opt for the latter, even when the 
commission is significantly higher than 
the fee would be. In all fairness to the 
advisers who are paid in this way, they will 
often provide ongoing advisory services 
free of charge because of the greater 
profit on the original deal. Nonetheless, 
the commission on a term life policy will 
amount to a significant part of the first 
year's payments. On a lump sum pension 
they can be even higher. Best advice ought 
to entail advising the client to request the 
adviser to re-invest the commission on 
the client's behalf. Failure to do this 
means that by the maturity of their 
investment the client could have lost a 
significant amount of money i.e., the 
commission and the investment proceeds, 
which would have been accrued to it 
during the time concerned.
O
NO FUNDAMENTAE FEAW
There are other examples that could be 
cited, but the core issue remains the 
same. The regulatory structure
established pursuant to the Financial 
Services Act 1986 and the Banking Act 1987 
is not fundamentally flawed. Most 
problems flow from the regulations and 
the interpretations put on them. If the 
Chancellor wishes to make financial 
regulation work it would be better advised 
to focus on this, and tinker as necessary 
with the regulatory structure. Instead 
they are committed to a vainglorious 
restructuring of the regulatory bodies,
which at best risks matters getting worse 
before any improvement takes place due 
to near inevitable teething problems. This 
is not a message to which the Chancellor 
seems receptive.
'Take care, your worship,' said Sancho; 'those 
things....are not giants but windmills, and what 
seem to be their arms are the sails, which are 
whirled round in the wind and make the 
millstones turn.'
'It is quite clear,' replied Don Quixote, 'thatyou 
are not experienced in this matter of adventures. 
They are giants, and if you are afraid, go away 
and say your prayers, whilst I advance and 
engage them in fierce and unequal battle.' w
Andrew Haynes
Head of Institute of Finance Law, University of 
Wolverhampton.
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Assessing the strengths and weakness of a Judical Appointments 
Commission
by Dr Kate Malleson
The role of the judiciary in public life 
has expanded significantly in recent 
years. This change has come about partly 
as a result of the growth in size of the 
judicial system and partly because of the 
increased activism of the judiciary 
through the development of judicial
REFORMS ELSEWHERE
In Canada and South Africa significant 
changes in appointments processes have 
been introduced in recent years (see M Fitz- 
James, 'Free expression and the Judges', New 
Law Journal, 30 April 1993 and S Kentridge, 
'Parliamentary Supremacy and the Judiciary 
under a Bill of Rights: Some Lessons from 
the Commonwealth' Public Law, Spring 
1997).
In New Zealand and Australia the systems 
remain largely unchanged but there have 
been growing calls for structural reforms. 
See the speech of the New Zealand Attorney 
General, P East, to the New Zealand Bar 
Association, March 1995, p. 2.
review. One consequence of this 
development has been to raise the level of 
interest in the judicial appointment 
process. As the size and political 
influence of the judiciary has increased, 
so have the demands for changes in the 
way judges are appointed. This link 
between the expansion of the judicial 
role and moves to reform the 
appointment process is not unique to 
England; it has also arisen in Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
The Human Rights Bill incorporating 
the European Convention on Human 
Rights into English law, which is 
currently going through Parliament, will 
take this process one stage further and, as 
Lord Irvine has acknowledged, will 
significantly increase the power of the 
judges (interviewed in New Statesman, 6 
December 1996). The pressure for 
reform is therefore very likely to grow 
after incorporation.
Before reviewing the possible effects 
which changes to the appointment 
process might have on the judiciary, it is 
worth examining more carefully the 
nature of the present system and the 
concerns which it has generated, in order 
to assess exactly what any reforms are 
intended to achieve. There are two 
aspects to the criticisms of the present 
system:
  the procedural failings of the system in 
terms of accountability, judicial 
independence and openness; and
  its failings in terms of the type of judge 
appointed.
THE APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS
The Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham, 
argued in 1996 that the key to a 
successful appointment process lies in:
'... an assumption shared by appointer, 
appointee and the public at large that those 
appointed should be capable of discharging 
their judicial duties, so far as humanly possible, 
with impartiality.' (Judicial Independence, 
speech to the Judicial Studies Board, 5 
November 1996, p. 5)
According to Lord Bingham, the
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principle of impartiality, though not 
synonymous with independence, is its 
'close blood tie' and therefore lies at the 
heart of a good appointment process. 
Thus judicial independence and, 
crucially, public and judicial confidence 
in its existence, is a central concern. The 
principle of judicial independence 
demands that judges should be free from 
outside interference in their decision- 
making, in particular, from those in 
government. To avoid this danger it is
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often said that the judges should not owe 
their office to the executive. On the face 
of it, therefore, the current arrangements 
whereby the Lord Chancellor and, in the 
case of the senior judges, the Prime 
Minister, have control of the 
appointment process, risks contravening 
the principle of judicial independence.
The Home Affairs Select Committee 
which reviewed the appointment process 
in 1996 considered this problem in some 
detail. The concern of those witnesses 
heard by the Committee, who criticised 13
